News:
- There is a open postdoc position based in Helsinki (deadline for application 15.1.2018).
The Project
The main objective of the project is the application and further development of a novel logical methodology for the study of the inferential aspect of modalities and conditionals and the study of the sources of related modal concepts in European philosophy.
Philosophical logic has been traditionally devoted to the study of such conceptual pairs as necessity and possibility, knowledge and belief, obligation and permission, etc. Its privileged approach has been, since the introduction of what is known as possible worlds semantics, the semantical one, to the extent that well-structured systems of proof were considered by many an a priori impossibility even for basic modal logics.Thus, the role of logic has been largely restricted to presenting classes of axiomatizations for the specific basic notions at hand. The axiomatic approach is, however, insufficient to represent the inferential process that requires hypothetical reasoning. Further, the classical systems of logic are inadequate to give a faithful representation of modalities and conditionals; these concepts, which are outside the idealized realm of mathematical entities, escape the standard truth value semantics, and even possible worlds semantics fails in providing a sufficiently general setting. The main problem addressed by the project will consist in answering to the challenge, set by the successful semantic methods, of a general proof theory of philosophical logic.
Philosophical logic has been traditionally devoted to the study of such conceptual pairs as necessity and possibility, knowledge and belief, obligation and permission, etc. Its privileged approach has been, since the introduction of what is known as possible worlds semantics, the semantical one, to the extent that well-structured systems of proof were considered by many an a priori impossibility even for basic modal logics.Thus, the role of logic has been largely restricted to presenting classes of axiomatizations for the specific basic notions at hand. The axiomatic approach is, however, insufficient to represent the inferential process that requires hypothetical reasoning. Further, the classical systems of logic are inadequate to give a faithful representation of modalities and conditionals; these concepts, which are outside the idealized realm of mathematical entities, escape the standard truth value semantics, and even possible worlds semantics fails in providing a sufficiently general setting. The main problem addressed by the project will consist in answering to the challenge, set by the successful semantic methods, of a general proof theory of philosophical logic.
